The poller crashed on every S3 or DB error (1162 restarts during the
fsn1 object storage degradation on 2026-09-21). Now:
- main loop catches errors per cycle, classifies them (S3 5xx/throttling,
connection/timeouts, psycopg.OperationalError = transient; everything
else logged with traceback) and retries with exponential backoff
(5 s .. 5 min, reset after success); db_init runs until it succeeds once
- explicit botocore config for the poller: connect/read timeouts, standard
retries (total attempts), s3v4, path addressing; S3(cfg) without a
config keeps the previous client for the Gundi path
- DB connect timeout + TCP keepalives
- one S3 client per cycle shared by all workers
- a batch stops after a transient S3/DB error (image stays ERROR as before)
- no busy loop when ready sets keep failing
- [HEARTBEAT] log line with counters, heartbeat file + Docker healthcheck
- tools/entrance_inventory.py: read-only listing of icu/entrance orphans
- unit tests with simulated S3/DB failures
Per-image transaction, status names/order, keys and paths are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ICU now pushes camera events via a Gundi-v2-compatible API instead of
dropping file triplets into S3. The new gundi-receiver service accepts
them directly, so images are in the system within seconds instead of
waiting out the 90s age gate + poll interval. OCR of the burnt-in camera
timestamp stays mandatory (ICU only sends server times; OCR detects
drifting camera clocks) but now runs asynchronously after ingest.
The push path writes a normalized model that separates what the legacy
metadata table conflates: camera_status (status time series), image
(image properties) and detection (classifications), plus the
image_with_status view as the portal's migration target. A repeatable,
batched migration splits existing metadata/category rows into it.
The legacy poller is unchanged and keeps writing metadata/category until
the portal is switched over.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Secrets (S3 keys, PG password, DeerMapper API key) were committed in
config.yaml and .env and remain in git history. This removes them from
the tracked tree and moves all secrets to env injection.
Security:
- config.yaml: drop all credentials, keep only non-secret app tunables
- untrack .env, add .env.example template; .gitignore excludes .env
- main.py: tolerant config lookups + fail-fast validation for missing secrets
- docker-compose: env_file injection, no full-repo bind mount, debug port off
- Dockerfile: bake config into image, run as non-root user
Efficiency:
- OCR: run the second (expensive) tesseract pass only when the first
is unparsable; identical fallback behavior
Docs:
- README with operation + security notes
- MIGRATION.md runbook: secret rotation, server cutover, decommission,
git history purge
Note: the leaked secrets are compromised and MUST be rotated; removing
them from the tree is not sufficient. See MIGRATION.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>